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Abstract 
This paper raises the problem of how to define revealed probabilistic beliefs in 
the context of  the capacity/Choquet Expected Utility model.  At the center of the 
analysis is a decision-theoretically  axiomatized definition of  "revealed 
unambiguous events."  The definition is shown to impose surprisingly strong 
restrictions on the underlying capacity and on the set of  unambiguous events; in 
particular, the latter is always an algebra.  Alternative weaker definitions violate 
even minimal criteria of  adequacy. 
Rather than finding fault with the proposed definition, we argue that our 
results indicate that the CEU model is epistemically restrictive, and point out that 
analogous problems do not arise within the Maximin Expected Utility model. Following Ellsberg's (1961) classical experiments, it has become widely accepted 
that the preferences of  empirical decision-makers often violate the consistency condi- 
tions characteristic of  classical Subjective Expected Utility theory, and in particular 
that they fail to reveal a well-defined subjective probability measure. 
There exists by now a variety of  axiomatic models designed to accommodate Ells- 
bergian behavior; the two most frequently studied are the Choquet and Maximin 
Expected Utility  Models (CEU respectively MMEU) due to Schmeidler (1989) re 
spectively Gilboa-Schmeidler (1989). 
While on a  heuristic and rhetorical level  the episternic distinction  between risk 
and uncertainty has been importaint in stimulating an interest in such non-standard 
models, little work  has been  done in determining their epistemic content,  i.e.  in 
relating preferences to appropriate notions of  belief (see Epstein-Zhang (1996), Sarin- 
Wakker (1995), and Nehring (1994.), as well  as Ghirardato (1996), Mukerjee (1996), 
and Nehring (1991) from rather different perspectives). 
This paper addresses a  particular  issue within this general problematics:  when 
can one legitimately attribute to a11  agent an unambiguous probabilistic belief about 
an event or set of  events? And, in a related vein: which conditions must preferences 
satisfy in order to  reflect / be consistent with a set of given ("objective") probabilities? 
A satisfactory answer to these basic quest'ons seems not only essential to an ad- 
equate understanding of  models of' non-probabilistic uncertainty, it also promises to 
have significant value in applications. By allowing to 'localize" ambiguous beliefs, it 
should yield models with more specific predictions and sharper comparisons to tra- 
ditional "global" expected-utility rnodels. For example, in a game-theoretic context, 
one may want to describe the extensive-form game itself (in particular the "moves 
of  Nature") in standard Bayesian  manner in terms of  unambiguous probabilities, 
while allowing at the same time foir  ambiguity in players' beliefs about other players' strategic choices ("strategic uncertainty") . 
We  will conduct the analysis in the context of  the CEU or  "capacity" model as 
does most of  the existing epistemic literature.  The fist thing to note is that, as 
simple and as elementary as they look, the questions raised do not have an obvious 
answer. Indeed, it will be seen that it is not even clear that any satisfactory answer 
exists within the CEU model. 
The non-triviality of  the issue becomes clear through the following preliminary con- 
sideration. For an agent to believe in the occurrence of  some event A with subjective 
probability a,  not only must the capacity of  A, v  (A), be equal to a, but that of  the 
complement must  be equal to its probability 1 -  a also.  But more is required.  If 
in addition the agent believes in the occurrence of  the disjoint set B with subjective 
probability P, then he also believes (of conceptual necessity) that the probability of 
the event AU  B is equal a+P,  hence v (A  U B) must be equal to a +p = u (A)  +v (B). 
Probability judgements have a ",logical  syntax" that needs to be accounted for. 
In the literature, only the very recent and thorough contribution by  Zhang (1997) 
has taken up the issue of  defining revealed probabilistic beliefs explicitly in the con- 
text of  an axiomatization of  CEU preferences for capacities that can be represented 
as "inner measuresn.l  Otherwise, the special case of  probability one beliefs has re- 
ceived quite a bit of  recent interest (see Haller (1995), Morris (1995), Sarin-Wakker 
(1995)); the issue has also connections with that of  defining independent product ca- 
pacities (see Hendon et al.  (l99!5),  Ghirardato (1995) and Eichberger-Kelsey (1996); 
cf.  section 5). 
The plan for the remainder of' the paper is as follows. 
Section 2 sets out  the issue of  defining  "revealed unambiguous events"  from a 
capacity, and establishes criteria  for  the  "soundness"  of  any  proposed  definition. 
These criteria are violated by  the simplest natural definitions (section 3). 
'Sarin-Wakker  (1992) define "revealed unambiguous  partitions" 
3 In section 4,  capacities are interpreted  as "rank-dependent  probability  assign- 
ments"; this suggests a definition of  unambiguous events with a canonical look  to 
it.  It is characterized in terms of  conditions on preferences wlio~e  applicability and 
appeal are not restricted to the CEU model.  All proposed definitions are shown to 
coincide for the class of  convex capacities. 
Section 5 characterizes the surprisingly strong implications of  unambiguous events 
for the underlying capacity, and shows that the class of  unambiguous events is always 
an algebra. The latter implies for example that whenever a decision-maker has prob- 
abilistic beliefs about the marginal distributions of  each of  a collection of  random 
variables, he has probabilistic beliefs about their joint distribution as well. 
This unwelcome implication might in  principle be accounted for in two ways : it 
may  indicate that the adopted definition is too strong; alternatively, it may show 
that the CEU model is applicable only when an agent's probabilistic beliefs take a 
certain form. In the concluding section 6, we  argue for the latter as the more plausible 
interpretation. 
2.  PRELIMINARIES 
Let  S  be a finite set of  states with #S = n, and let  AS denote the probability- 
, simplex on S. 
A capacity v  is a mapping from the power set 2'  of  S into [O,1]  such that v (8) = 0, 
v  (S)  = 1, and v  (A)  2 v(B)  whenever  A  > B. It is  convea: if  for  all  A,  B  E 2S : 
v(A)+v(B)  <U(A~B)+V(AL\B). 
The expectation of  a random-variable f : S  -+ R with respect to the capacity v is 
defined as its Choquet-integral with {s~)~,~,.,.,~  chosen such that f (sj)  2  f  (sk)  whenever j  5 k.2 
Let  C denote a set of  consequences.  An  act x maps states to consequences, x : 
S t  C, or, in equivalent notation, z  E c'. A preference ordering  on CS has a 
"Choquet Expected IJtility" (CEU) representation  if  there exist a capacity v and a 
utility-function u : C +  R such that x  y if  and only if  J u o  xdv 2 J  u  o  ydv. 
To simplify argument and notation, we will focus on "risk-neutral" decision-makers 
with C = R and u = id. AS long as the "true" utility-function u is defined on a con- 
nected domain C and is continuous, this is without effective loss of generality. Under 
risk-neutrality, a capacity inducts a unique CEU preference-ordering k, according 
to the condition:  x 2,  y if  and only if  S xdv >_ J ydv. 
The task is to define from a given capacity v a collection of  "revealed unambiguous" 
events &a  for which the agent is understood to have probabilistic beliefs.  Within 
the CEU-model (which is assumed throughout), this is equivalent to defining A;a in 
terms of  the associated preferencerelation k, due to the one-to-one relation between 
the two.  Conceptually, a  primitive definition of  unambiguous events should  be in 
terms of  the preference relation as  the primitive entity; this point of  view is adopted 
in section 4 which attempts to prlovide "the right" definition. On the other hand, the 
implications of  any given definition are more easily described in terms of  the capacity 
representation; likewise, the set of  possible definitions is more easily surveyed in terms 
of  the representation. 
To be satisfactory, Ay  should have the property that for any three events A, B,  C 
such that the value of  a  probability  measure on C is uniquely determined  by  its 
values on A and B, C must be in A;"  whenever both A and B are. In the measure- 
theoretic terminology introduced by  Zhang (1997) into decision-theory, &a  must be 
a A-system. Definition 1  A  collection A E 2"  is a A -  system if it  has the following  two prop- 
erties: 
1) 0, S E A, 
ia)A,B€A, A>  B=+A\B€A. 
A is an algebra if  it satisfies in addition 
ziz)A,B~d+AnB~d. 
Remark: Zhang (1997, lemma 2.1) shows that a A-system defined by i) and ii) is 
always closed under disjoint unions: 
In general, one will not want A::a  to be an algebra. For instance, if S = S1 x S2, 
with non-singleton S1 and S2,  then AEa  = {T x  S2 I T C S1) U {S1  x T  I T C S2) 
says that an agent has "unambiguous", "probzbilistic" marginal beliefs about each 
component  of  the state,  but  "non.-probabilistic", "ambiguous"  beliefs about their 
joint distribution.  Ay  is a A-system but not an algebra. 
Furthermore, one will want  v on Aua  to be "coherently interpretable" as a proba- 
bility; this is captured by 
Definition 2  v is probabilistically coherent on A if there exists a probability measure 
p on 2'  that agrees with v on A. 
Note that "probabilistic coherence" implies additivity of  v on A but is not implied 
by it, even if  A is a A-system (fact 2). 
A successfui definition of  "revealed unambiguous belief" makes it possible to ex- 
press formally the notion that an agent's beliefs incorporate a set of  "given" proba- 
bilities ("set of  probabilistic const~.aints").  These may be thought of  as information 
in the form of  objective probabilities, but need not be. Definition 3  A probabilistic constraint set is a pair (C, +) , wherr C  2S and 4 : 
C +  [O, 11  is pmbabilistically cohemnt on C. 
The capacity v is consistent with (C, 4) if 
z)  u(A) =+(A) forallA~C,  and 
i2) 4'' 2 C . 
Example 1 Let S  =  {a, b, c, d), C  =  {{a, b) , {c, d) ,  {a, d)  ,  {b, c) ,0,  S}, 
4 ({a, b)) = 4 ({b, c)) = 0.9, 4 ({a, dl) = 4 ({c, 4)  = 0.1 ,  +(0) = 0, +(S) = 1, and 
v  (A) = sup {+  (E)  I  E E  C, E  A)  . Szipkose that  = C .  Then v is consis- 
tent with (C,4) , and AUa  sat@Cies all the desiderata lasted above:  it is  a A-system, 
and v on AUa  is pmbabilistically coherent. 
Nonetheless,  v is not "truly consistent" with (C, 4) .  In particular,  v ({b))  = 0, 
while v  ({a,  c, d)) = 0.1 ; in terms of  decision making, betting on {b)  is dispreferred 
to betting on its complement  S\  {b), i.e.  lfa,c,d)  +v  l~,),  with  1~ denoting the 
indicator-function of  the event  .A.  Since the probability of  {b)  is "objectively" at 
least 0.8, and thus at least four times as large as that of  its complement, this seems 
hardly acceptable:  it is  materially irrational for the decision-maker to bet on the 
event that is unambiguously less likely in view of  his information (C, 4).4 It follows 
that on the correct definition of  A?,  A?  cannot contain C, so that v would not be 
underwritten by 4"  as consistent with (C, 4). 
The requirements on a minimally satisfactary definition of  unambiguous events are 
summarized in the following notion of  "soundness". 
3A sirnilar capacity is defined in example 1.1 of  Zhang (1997). 
4Note that the event {a,c,d)  is  unambiguously less likely than the event  {b), although neither 
event is unambiguous in itself. Such more general forms of unambiguous probabilistic beliefs will be 
treated in Nehring (1997). Definition 4  A definition of  revealed unambiguous events is a mapping Ata : v H 
&a  . It b sound iff, for all capacities v : 
a) AT  is a A-system, 
ii) for dl E E 2'  : v  ia  pmbabilistically coherent on @  U {E)  . 
To illustrate clause ii), consider again example 1. Here v fails to be probabilistically 
coherent on AEa  U {b)  , whenever A;"  52  C  . To be sound, v would need to satisfy 
v({b})  > 0.8 and v({a,  c,  d)) < 0.2. 
If ea  is an algebra rather than merely a A-system, the second clause simplifies. 
Fact 1  If A is an dgebna, the following two statements are equivalent: 
i) for all E E 2'  : v is  probabilistically  coherent on @  U  {E)  . 
ii) v  is additive on  A, i.e.  for all A , B E A such that A  fl  B = 0  , v (A)  +  v (B)  = 
v(AU  B) . 
A  trivial  example of  a sound definition of  revealed  unambiguous events is  the 
constant  mapping v  I-+  (0,  S) for  all  v  .  Thus "soundness" of  the definition says 
only that the events given  by ea  can be thought of  as "genuinely unambiguous / 
probabilistic"; it does not address the issue whether A;a  comprises all "genuinely 
probabilistic" events. 
3. THE PROBLEM 
A particularly simple and straightforward definition of  unambiguous events is given 
This however fails miserably: 43,  is generally not closed under disjoint unions, thus 
failing to qualify as a A-system.  Moreover, even if  At happens to be an algebra, v 
may fail to be additive on A;. Example 2  Let S = {a,  b, s)  and define v by 
0 if  #As1 
Y  (A) := 
1 if  #A22  . 
Here &  = 2',  but Y  is  not a pmbability-measure. 
The example suggests that &  fails to LLb~ild  in" additivity with respect to events 
outside the partition {A,  A'} . A :natural move is to strengthen the definition to 
4  seems on the right track; for instance, it ensures additivity of  v  on A:  whenever 
the latter is an algebra.  A!  has been adopted with reservations by  Zhang (1997), 
who gives a  preference-based characterization  of  it and notes that it may fail to 
be a  X -system,  violating condition ii) as for instance in example 2, where & = 
(A  E  2S I  #A > 2) . He responds to this by simply imposing the second condition on 
&;  note that this is in effect a restriction on the domain of  capacities to which the 
definition v H &  is applied. 
Yet  even if  this domain-restriction is accepted, A!  is unsound.  In example 1, for 
instance, 4  =  C, which makes & unsound as shown above. Indeed, v may even fail 
to be probabilistically coherent  on! A;. 
Fact  2  There exist capacities v such that A;  is a A-system and v  is not probabilisti- 
cally coherent on A:;  in  particular,  not  :very q that is  additive on a A-system A can 
be  extended  to a probability-measure  on 2'. 
Proof.  See appendix. 4. THE PROPOSAL 
Consider a risk-neutral5 decision-maker who has to decide between two acts x and 
y such that x -  y is  {A, A
C)-measurable (ie. constant within A and A
C) and such that 
XA  > y~.  A decision in favor of  x  over y can be viewed as accepting the ancemental 
bet x-y  on A. If the decision-maker assigns an unambiguous subjective probability to 
the event A, the zncnzmental bet has an unambiguous expectation, and it seems highly 
reasonable that he should accept tllis incremental bet if  and only if  its expectation is 
positive. Conversely, this condition yields a natural criterion for    he non-ambiguity 
of  an event. 
Definition 5  The  event  A  is  >--unambiguow if,  for all x, y  such  that x -  y  is 
{A, Ac)-measurable,  a: 2  y # x -  y >- 0. 
To characterize >-,-unambiguous events directly in terms of  the capacity, it proves 
helpful to interpret capacities as "rank dependent probability assignments". 
A ranking of  states is a one-to-one mapping p : S -+  (1, ..., n),  let R  denote the 
set of  such rankings.  The ranking, p is a neighbour of  p'  ("pNp
l") iff, for at most 
two states s  E  S : p(s) # pl(s), and, for all s E  S,  I p(s) -  p
l(s) )I  1.  A mapping 
T : 'R  -+ AS is called a rank-dependent probability assignment (RDPA) ifT for all p, p1 
such that pNpl, and all s E S such that p(s) = pl(s) : T,({s))  = T~I({s)). 
For any capacity v, define a mapping .rrv : R  --+  AS by T; ({t}) = v ({s  (  p (s) I  p (t)})- 
v ({s I p (s) < p (t))). When there is no ambiguity, we will often drop the superscript 
in d'.  There is a one-t~one  relation between capacities and RDPAs. 
5As  mentioned above, this is without major lass of generality; in particular, 'Lrisk-neutrality"  is an 
entirely standard feature of  models in which consequences are defined in  "robability  currency", as 
in an Anscombe-Aumann framework. An explicit analysis along these lines wiU  be given in Nehring 
(1997). Proposition 1  A  mapping n : 72  -+ AS  is a mnk-dependent  probability  assignment 
if  and only if there  is a (unique) capacity v such that T = nu. 
Proof.  The if-part is immediate from the definition of  an RDPA. 
For the converse, in view of  the following lemma, one can set v(A)  = rp(A)  for any 
p such that A =  {s  E S  (  p(s) qg #A}.  This yields a capacity v with the property 
that T" = T. 
Lemma 1  For all A E 2'  and  p, p'  E R  such that A = {s  E S  I  p(s) 5 #A) = {s  E 
S I p'(~)  <  #A} :  rP(A)  =  rPl(.A). 
Proof of lemma.  Note first that the claim of  the lemma is straightforward from 
the definition of  an RDPA for all p, p'  s,uch that pNp'. 
Now  take arbitrary p, p'  f  R  . It is clear that there exists a sequence of  rankings 
{pjJjlk  such that p~ = p1 pk  = ,o' and pjNpj+l for  all j  < k, and such that  A = 
{s  E S  I  pj(s) < #A). Since rpj  ('4) = 7~,,~+~  (A)  for all j from the above, one obtains 
rp  (A)  = np1 (A)  a desired. 
Say that p is  wmonotonic with z  E R'  if,  for all s and t,  p (s) 2  p(t)  implies 
x,  < xt.  It is easily verified  that Choquet-integration of  x  amounts to ordinary 
integration with respect to the appropriate rank-dependent probability measure rp  , 
i.e. that J xdv = J xdrp  for any p that is comonotonic to x. 
An interpretation of  the capacity model and of  Choquet-integration along simi- 
lar lines has recently been advocated hy  Sarin-Wakker (1995). It also arises natu- 
rally from within Schrneidler's (1989) classic contribution, in that his Comonotonic 
Independence axiom is  simply the Independence axiom restricted  to comonotonic 
equivalence classes (classes of  actis comonotonic to the same ranking p). 
On an RDPA interpretation of  a capacity, ambiguity of  an event is naturally asso- 
ciated with dependence of  the assigned probability on the ranking. Correspondingly, 
an event is naturally defined as unambiguous if  its rank-dependent probability does not depend on the ranking : 
A, := {A  I rr,; (A)  ==  Y (A)  for all p E 12 I 
Note that it follows directly from the definition that A, is a A-system and that the 
definition v H  A, is sound. 
Say that A is connected with respect to p if, for all s,  s', s
t'  such that p (s)  < p  (s') < 
p (s") , A 3  s
t whenever A > {s,  s").  Then A:  can be written as follows : 
d:  = {A  I T; (A)  =  Y (A)  for all p E R  such that A is connected with respect to p  . 
Thus,  from a  rank-dependent point-of-view,  looks like  an ad-hoc-restricted 1 
version of  A,. 
That A, is the right definition of  unanlbiguous events is confirmed by the following 
theorem. 
Theorem 1  The following three statements are equivalent: 
Z)  A E A, . 
ii) A is ?,-unambiguous  . 
iii) For all x,  y such that  y is {.A, Ac)-measurable, 
J(x+y)  du=Jxdv+Jydu. 
Proof. The implications iii) +  ii) and ii) 3 i) are easily verified; by contrast, the 
implication i) 3 iii) is non-trivial. 
Definition 6  For A E 2S, let E]  denote the following  equivalence relation on R  : 
p =A  p'  iff, for all s,  t  such that {s,  t)  L A  or {s,  t)  L A
C  : 
P (4  <  P (t) -  P'  (4  < P'  (t)  . 
Also, define  for p E R  and A E 2'  an  associated  mnking m~  R uniquely by the 
following two conditions: 
i)  for all s E A,  t E A
C : PA (s)  <:  PA  (1.) , and 
The key to the proof is the following ]lemma. Lemma 2  If  A E A,,  then, for all p, p'  such that p =A  P' :  7rp =  Xpr. 
Proof of the lemma. Note first that it suffices to prove validity of  the claim for 
neighbouring rankings p and p',  since any  two p and p'  satisfying p  %A p'  can be 
connected by a chain of  neighbowing rankings pl, ...,  pk  satisfying pj =A pj+l. 
Assume thus pNp',  take any B E 2S,  and let u  (A) = a. 
The following table describes the rank-dependent probabilities for the events in 
B:= {AnB,AnBC,ACnB,AC~?BC), 
From p %A p'  and pNp', it follows that 7rp (A n B) = Xpr (A n B) or  7rp (A n  Bc) = 
wp1 (A n B
c)  , as well as wp (A
C n B) =  IT~I  (A
C n B) or wp (Ac n B
C) = 7r,1 (Ac n B
C)  . 
Inspecting the table, this yields immediately wp (An  B) = 7rp1 (An  B) as well  as 
7rp (A
C  fl  B) = 7rP1 (Ac rl  B)  , hence wp  (13) =  7rP1 (B)  . 
Consider now  A  E A,  and x,  :y  such that y is {A, Ac)-measurable.  Let p be any 
ranking that is comonotonic with x. Tnen by  the {A, Ac)-measurability of  y, x +  y 
is comonotonic with some p'  such that p'  =A p.  By  the lemma, 7rp = wp'  Note that 
S yd7rpl = J ydv since A E A,  and y is .(A,  Ac)-measurable. 
Thus S (X + y) dv = S (x  +  y)  d!7rpl = S xd7rPl + S yd7rpt = J xd7rp + S yd7rp1 = S xdv 
+Jydv.  H 
It is also of  interest to note that the proper definition of  unambiguous events is a 
live issue only for non-convex capacities:;  for convex capacities, all proposed definitions coincide. 
Proposition 2 For any convex u :  A,  = A:  = A:. 
Proof. We  need only to show that A,  > A:. 
It is well known6 that any convex capacity has the following representation: 
v  (E) = minPER  7rp (E)  for all E E  2S. 
Suppose that A 4 A,,  i.e.  that for some pl,p2 E 72 :  rpl  (A) < rp2  (A). Since 
u (A) 5 rpl  (A) and v  (A
C) 5 1 -  rp2  (A) by  the representation, v (A) +  v  (A
C) < 1, 
and thus A $ A:. 
5. IMPLICATIONS 
Unambiguous events turn out both to have a surprising amount of  structure them- 
selves, and entail surprisingly strong restrictions on  the capacity that hosts them. 
The blame for these apparently excessive implications is tentatively assigned in the 
concluding section 6. 
Theorem 2  For any capacity u, ,A, is  an algebra. 
Proof . We  need to show that A,  is intersection-closed. Thus, take A, B E A,, 
andlet B:= {AnB,A~BC,ACnB,ACnBL). 
Since we  know that, for all p E 72,  7rp (A) =  u (A) and 7rp (B)  = v (B)  , we  have 
We  need to show that rp  (A  n  B) is independent of  p. 
'see  for example Chateauneuf-JafTray (198Y). 
14 Consider p,p' such that p is a neighbour of  F'rom the definitional property of 
an RDPA it follows that rp  (E)  = np,  (E)  for at least two E E B.  However, in view 
of  (I),  this implies that the rank-dependent probability of  all four events in B stays 
the same, and in particular, that rp  (A fl  B)  = npr (A  n B)  . 
Now  take arbitrary p,#  E  32  .  It is clear  that there  always exist  a sequence 
of rankings {pj)jlk  such that  PO  = p,pk = # and ~jNpj+~  for  all  j  < k. Since 
npj  (A  fl B) = rpj+l  (A  n  B)  for  all j  from the above,  one obtains  n, (A  fl  B) = 
nP,  (A  n  B)  a desired. . 
This is not all; in addition, a capac.ity is always "additively separable" across its 
unambiguous events. 
For a capacity v,  define the set of  its "separating events" 
Theorem 3  For any capacity v:,  A, =: A:. 
Proof. 
Av  : Take any  A  E A,  and B  E 2S. Let  p be any ranking such that, for all 
sl E A  n  B,  s2 E  A
C n  B  and sj (=_  B
C  : p (sl)  < p (s2)  < p(s3)  . 
By construction, 
rP  (13) = v (B)  . 
Since p =A p~  by  definition, one obtains :ram lemma 2, 
F'rom the interdefinition of  n  and Y and the definition of  PA,  one obtains 
nP,  (B)  = v(An  B)  -t [v(Au(ACn  B))  -v(A)]. 
Finally, since A, 2 4, These four equalities imply v (B)  = u (A n  B) + v (A
C n B)  , as desired.  0 
dv2&: 
Take any A E &,  and arbitrary ,p,  p'  E R  ;  we have to show that np  (A) = n,~  (A) . 
The key is the following lemma. 
Lemma 3  If A E &, then, for dl  p E  E! :  T, = T,, 
Proof of lemma. 
For any j I n, let Sf := {s  E S  I  p  (s) 5 j)  . 
Fix any j . By  definition, T, (s;) = v (s;) . 
Since A E A",, 
v(s;)  = v(S$nA) +V(S,P~A~), 
as well as 
v(S;nAc)  = ~((sP~A')  UA) -"(A), 
and thus 
"(5';)  =v(S?n~)  +v((S;nAc)uA)  -v(A). 
In  turn,  the  right-hand side of  this equation  is easily  verified  to  be equal to 
a(,,)  (s;) . We  thus have  n-,  (s;)  = n-  (s)  for  all  j  5 n, and  therefore also 
n-,  = TPA  . a 
The claim of the theorem is now  easily established. 
We  have np  (A) = npA  (A)  (by lernma 3)) 
= u (A) (by definition), 
= n,,,  (A) (by definition), 
= T,I  (A) (by lemma 3 again).  W 
Remark: Zhang (1997) shows that 
A",&:={AE~SI~(A~UB)~=~(A~)+~(B)  forall~~s~and~~~~), 
considers (and rejects) & as a  possible  definition of  unambiguous events, and 
gives a decision-theoretic (almost-) characterization.  The intuitive content of  & or &  as capturing the events to1  which the agent assigns an unambiguous subjective 
probability is however not clear. And indeed, as pointed out in section 6, the decision- 
theoretic definitions of  unambiguous events underlying A,  and &  diverge outside the 
CEU model. 
Theorems 2 and 3 yield as a corollary a characterization of  the class of  capacities 
consistent with a given set of  prmobabilistic  constraints. 
For C E 2S, let C* denote the algebra generated by C, C* := n  {B > C I  B is an algebra), 
and let F*  denote the minimal non-empty ele nents of  that algebra which form a par- 
tition of  S. 
Corollary 1 v is  consistent wiih the constmints (C, 4) if  and only if 
i)  forallA~C,  v(A) =4(A),  and 
ii) for all A E 2S : v (A) = C  v (A  n  F) 
FE3" 
Proof. "If": By theorem 3 and ii), .A,  > C* > C ; hence v is consistent with (C, 4) 
by  i). 
"  Only if" : i) is obvious. 
ii) Let P  =  and  define  t3j = U, Fi. By  theorem 2,  A,  > F*.  Since 
-  i23 
Bj+l = Bj n FjC,  it follows from theorem 3 
that v (A n  Bj) = v (A n  Fj)  -t v (A n  Bj+l)  for all j : 1 5 j 5 k -  1. 
Repeated substitutions yield  immediately v (A)  = v (A fl  BI) = C  v (A n Fj) . 
jIk 
Corollary 1 suggests a natural definition of  the independent product of  a capacity 
and a  probability measure, for  what  it  is worth7.  Suppose that S = 5'1  x S2 , 
A2 = {sl  x A  /  A E 2'2)  . Let a probability 42  on A2 be given, as well as a "marginal 
capacity" y  on dl  analogously defined. 
'~n  view of the epistemic restricteclness of  the capacity-framework suggested in section 6. 
17 Proposition 3  Them ezists a unique product capacity v (=:  ul@  42) such that 
a)  Y  is consistent with (A2,  42) , and 
ii)forallA€S1,B€S2:~(A:~B)==~(AxS2).~(SlxB). 
Proof. Uniqueness: For s E S2,  let E, =  {t  E Sl  (  (t,  s) E  E)  . By corollary 1 and 
i) Y (E) = C  Y (E, x (9))  , hence by ii), Y (E) is uniquely determined by 
5E  S2 
Existence:  Y defined by (2) clearly satisfies i) and ii).  H 
The charm of  proposition 3 lies in the fact  that the consistei~cy  requirement  i) 
uniquely singles out the product  c.apacity ul  @ 42 which has been considered (and 
compared to alternative definitions:)  by  Hendon et al. (1995) and Ghirardato (1995), 
and also appears in Eichberger-Kekey (1996). 
6. DISCUSSION 
The results of  section 5 indicate that a capacity-representation of  preferences and 
probabilistic constraints on beliefs do not live together very harmoniously; in many 
situations, one will have to give.  Which of  the two will depend on one's  judgement 
about which is more fundamental.  To us, it seems evident that probabilistic con- 
straints are the more fundamental notion; indeed, it seems hard to even imagine 
what kind of  argument might be adduced that could render probabilistic constraints 
defeasible. 
This judgment is confirmed by the fact that it takes very little to obtain consistency 
with probabilistic  constraints on preferences and beliefs in a satisfactory way.  In 
particular, consistency can be achieved in  the MMEU  model  in  which  capacities 
are replaced by  closed convex sets of  probabilities IT, and Choquet integration  by 
"maximin integration" J xdn :=min J xd?r . 
~~17 In the MMEU-model, an event A is naturally defined as II-unambiguous if a(A) = 
al(A) for all a, a'  E  II ; note th.at this definition coincides with the one given for ca- 
pacities whenever the two intepation-functionals coincide ( i.e.  for convex capacities 
v and their core, cf.  proposition 2). Under this definition, it can be shown that the 
preferencebased characterizatbn of  unambiguous events in the manner of  theorem 1 
is preserved, while none of  the adverse consequences are entailed. 
The latter is demonstrated by considering the following example (cf.  Zhang (1997), 
example 1.1). 
Example 3  Let S =  T x T, with T = {a, b)  and define the probabilistic wnstmints 
by  (C, 4), with  C  =  (0, S, {a) x TI  {b) x T, T x {a), T x {b))  and 4 ({a) x T) = 
4 (T x {a)) = 3.  Note that C  defines a A-system, not an algebra. 
In the MMEU model (but not in the CEU model!), these constraints are consistent 
with "complete ignorance" about the joint distribution of  the first and second com- 
ponent, i.e..  with setting  S l{(o,,a),(b,b))dll  = S l~(a,b),(b,,)~dll = 0.  This is uniquely 
achieved by  the set of  priors II*  = {s  E A
S I a ({a)  x T) = a (T x {a)) = 4) which 
is not the core of  a convex capacity. 
It is easily verified that the set, of  II*-unambiguous  events is exactly the A-system C. 
Note also that the analogue to the problematic separability condition for unambiguous 
events as in theorem 3 is not entailed; for instance, for  A =  {a} x T and B = T x {a}, 
we  have S ledn* = !j  # 0 = S lsnAdn*  +  lBnACdn*,  while A is n*-unambiguous. 
If A, is accepted as the correct definition of  unambiguous events in the CEU model 
(for instance on the basis of  its equivalence with the class of  &unambiguous  events), 
theorems  2 and 3 are naturally read as describing epistemic pmsuppositions of  the 
CEU model. In particular, for the CEU-model to be applicable, the decision maker's 
probabilistic beliefs must range over an algebra. 
- It may  seem  hard to imagine  how  capacities could possibly  be episternically  , 
restrictive, since their definition. seems to involve only trivial assumptions (essentially monotonicity  ) . Such an intuition. forgets, however, that capacities acquire decision- 
theoretic meaning only  as parameters of  Choquet integrals x  I+  Jxdv , a  point 
argued extensively in Sarin-Wakker (1995). The class of  Choquet integrals, as well 
as the class of  preference orders it serves to represent, is characterized by non-trivial 
properties which a priori might well be restrictive. - 
The analysis of  this paper has been special in  two dimensions:  it has focused on 
the CEU  model, and it has been concerned with unconditional probabilistic beliefs. 
, 
An analysis more general in both respects will be pursued in future work  (Nehring 
1997); it will entail the proposed definition A,  as a special case. APPENDIX 
Proof of Fact 2. 
By  complexlfying example 1, this can be  shown with the help of  the following 
lemma. 
Lemma  4  Suppose A E  2S ha  the following three properties: 
i)@€A, 
ii) A E A implies A
C  E A , 
iii) A,  B E A\  (0)  and A  fl  B = 0 imply B = A
C. 
Suppose  also that q : A -4 [O, 11  satisfies, for all A E  A : 
2) q (0) = 0 
ii) q (A) > 0 if A # 0, and 
iii) q (A) + q (A
C) = 1. 
Then A is a A-system, and q can be  extended to a capacity v such that &  = A. 
Proof of lemma. 
It is straightforward to verify th.at A is a A-system.  Define v on 2'  by  v  (A) = 
sup  {q (E) I E E A,  E 5 A) ;  following Zhang (1997),  v may be called the "inner mea- 
sure" of  q. The set-function v is evidently a well-defined capacity; it has the following 
two properties: 
i) A E  A and B c A
C  (strictly) implies v (B:  = 0. 
ii) A E A and A C B c S imply v(B) := q(A). 
Verification: i) The assumptions imply A
C  E  A, hence, for no E C B, E E A. 
ii) Similarly, the assumptions imply: if  E C B and E E A then E = A. 
Consider A E A and B disjoint from A. 
If B =  A
C, then v (A U B) = v (A) +  Y (:B)  by  assumption ii) on q. 
If  B c A
C, then v (A U B) = v (A.) =  v (A) + v (B) by  properties i) and ii) of  v. 
This shows that A S &. 
Consider now  A $ A.  By  the assumptions on A, at most one of  {A, A
C) contains some E E  A. 
Hence by  properties i) and ii) of  v, and assumption ii) on q : v (A)  + v (A
C)  < 1, 
which shows that 4  C A. 
Consider  now  A and  q  2ven  by  the following table,  letting  S = T  x T  with 
T =  {a,  6,  c)  . 
T  x -(c)  1-P 
7 
({a)  >:  T)  U (T x {a))  1 -  7 
0 
1 
A is easily checked to satisfy the assumptions of  the lemma; q satisfies the assump 
tions as well whenever a,  p, 7 E (0,l).  Let v denote the inner measure induced by  A 
and q. Then v is probabilistically incoherent on A:  = A whenever a +  ,6'  + y < 1. 
This is seen as follows. Suppose q (=  v on A) has an additive extension p on 2'. 
Then  p({(c,  c))) 2  1 -  p({a,  6) x T)  -  p(T x {a,  6)) =  1 -  CY. -  P, but  also 
p  ({(c,  c)))  5 7,  which implies 1 5 a  + /3  + 7.  W REFERENCES 
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